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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines corporate governance in Japan since the 1990s.  Its focus includes 
financial reporting, a key part of good governance. It offers an overview of various legal, 
institutional, and stakeholder aspects of governance, followed by an investigation of 
Japanese accounting, disclosure, and reporting. The paper presumes that accurate 
financial reporting is a prerequisite for good corporate governance.  Bad governance 
often follows from fraudulent financial reporting. The paper also considers the status of 
international financial reporting standards, the nature of fraudulent financial reporting, 
the all-too-common practice of window dressing in Japan, the liabilities of corporate 
audit board members and financial auditors. Our findings suggest that the existing high 
quality laws, codes, guidelines, and institutional arrangements do improve corporate 
governance. Yet in practice, the quality of corporate governance in Japan has not 
matched the quality of its codes and regulations. The paper discusses Japan's new 
corporate governance code. It concludes that this code is excellent, but that more needs 
to be done to improve financial reporting. Finally, a number of suggestions are offered to 
enhance corporate governance and reduce fraudulent reporting.  
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Introduction 
 
Corporate governance (CG) concerns the very fundamental question of who owns 
a corporation, in whose interests it is run (Ohtsu & Imanari, 2002), and by whom 
it is ultimately controlled (Miwa, 2006a). CG is also defined as the mechanisms, 
processes, and relations by which corporations are controlled (Shailer, 2004). In 
line with the ideas of Berle and Means (1932) concerning the separation of 
ownership and control, control of the modern corporation has shifted from 
stockowners to professional managers. This result is due to the inertia of 
stockowners, their use of the proxy in annual general meetings (AGM), and the 
self-perpetuation of management.  Autonomy of management and the concern 
that management is now seeking its own interests at the expense of stockowners 
and broader society have increased interest in CG. Indeed, CG is now at the very 
top of the agenda in the broader debate on the role of companies in the world 
economy.   
 
Accurate financial reporting is the foundation of good corporate 
governance. All aspects of corporate control require the objective measurement 
of the firm's assets, liabilities and cash flows. CG is a "framework of rules and 
practices by which a board of directors ensures accountability, fairness, and 
transparency in a company's relationship with all its stakeholders (financiers, 
customers, management, employees, government, and the community)" (Business 
Dictionary, 2015). CG includes the processes through which corporate goals and 
objectives are determined, measured and pursued in the context of the social, 
regulatory, and commercial environment. Mechanisms for effective CG include 
monitoring the actions, policies, and decisions of corporations and their agents. 
However, another way to improve CG is to align the interests of management and 
stakeholders (Organisation For Economic Cooperation And Development 
(OECD), 2004; Tricker, 2009).   
 
Interest in CG practices, particularly in relation to financial reporting, has 
increased substantially following the high-profile collapses of a number of large 
corporations in the US (Enron and MCI), Australia (HIH and One.Tel), and 
Europe (Parmalat) during 2001–2002; all of these involved accounting fraud.  CG 
gained further importance at a different level for business, government, and 
research after the financial crisis of 2008, which climaxed with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in the US Apart from these, corporate scandals of different 
forms in both developed and developing nations have increased public and 
government interest in the regulation of CG. For example, after the Enron crisis, 
the US government enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002, with the aim of 
improving financial reporting and restoring public confidence in CG (Goergen, 
2012).   
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The structure of effective CG consists of "(a) explicit and implicit 
contracts between the company and the stakeholders for distribution of 
responsibilities, rights, and rewards, (b) procedures for reconciling the sometimes 
conflicting interests of stakeholders in accordance with their duties, privileges, 
and roles and (c) procedures for proper supervision, control, and information 
flows to serve as a system of checks-and-balances" (Business Dictionary, 2015). 
CG allocates and assigns responsibilities among different participants: board 
members, management, stockowners, creditors, auditors, regulators, and other 
stakeholders, and establishes the rules and procedures for making decisions in 
corporate affairs (Tricker, 2009).   
 
This paper explores financial reporting in Japan under the presumption 
that accurate financial reporting is a prerequisite for effective CG. The next 
section describes the legal basis of corporate governance in Japan. The third 
section extends this discussion to the disclosure of important financial 
information.  The fourth explores some of the unique aspects of CG in Japan. The 
fifth section explains Japan's new code of corporate governance; it argues that the 
code is good in the sense that it is consistent with the OECD's governance 
principles, yet notes that persistent reporting scandals and poor financial 
performance mean that these laws and guidelines do not actually deliver good 
governance. The sixth section offers suggestions to improve financial reporting 
and governance. The last section offers a conclusion. 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
 
The Company Law, the Commercial Code, and Corporate Governance  
 
The legal foundation of CG in Japan derives from the Commercial Code (Act No. 
48 of 1899; amended by Act No. 57 of 2008). Most of the provisions of this law 
for public limited liability companies were revised and included in the 
Companies Act, 2005. The Commercial Code specifically established that 
shareholders are the ultimate owners of the company. It grants broad and specific 
rights to shareholders. The shareholders elect directors in the company's AGM, 
who in turn select management. Shareholders ultimately elect all statutory 
auditors, who then monitor the board of directors and ensure that it works in 
accordance with the provisions of the law. The law grants minority shareholders 
elaborate rights; the holder of a 1% or greater stake for more than six months is 
able to make proposals at the AGM; the holder of a 3% or greater stake can 
demand a board meeting at any time; and the holder of a 10% or greater stake can 
access confidential documents (Shishido, 2000).   
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The spirit of the laws establishing Japanese CG articulates the highest 
principles. Yet as described below, repeated scandals and persistent poor 
financial performance mean that these laws all too often fail to produce good 
governance. Management tends to regard CG as a low-priority matter of technical 
compliance, and in some cases as something to be cynically circumvented when 
it becomes inconvenient. Historically, shareholder meetings in Japan have been 
very short and, though far less common now, corporate racketeers (sokaiya) 
occasionally practiced extortion at annual general meetings by asking 
embarrassing questions. On some occasions companies actually employed 
racketeers to intimidate legitimate stockowners at these meetings. Even now 
minority shareholders tend to lack a keen interest in AGM. They frequently cast 
votes electronically or by proxy rather than actually attend the meetings. 
Although external auditors are supposed to monitor the activities of board 
members and management, they are effectively appointed by the president and 
are typically people who possess a close relationship with the company. 
Ahmadjian (2002, p. 92) argues that "the shareholders meeting is little more than 
a rubber stamp" for board appointments, dividend declarations, and other 
important decisions. Thus, auditors largely fail to play a significant role in 
establishing effective corporate governance in Japan.  
 
Board of Directors and Stockowners Governance     
 
The Japanese Companies Act No. 86 of July 26, 2005 gives shareholders certain 
legal rights, which include, (a) a share in the profit if a dividend is declared, (b) 
inspection of the company's accounts at any time and in any case of need, and (c) 
the right to vote to elect or remove members of the board of directors. Ohtsu and 
Imanari (2002) observe that most stockowners look on their stock as an 
investment; as long as dividends are paid and the stock's price appreciates, they 
have little interest in the details of management.  If they are dissatisfied, they sell 
their stock rather than make an effort to change the management of the company.   
 
As indicated above, the primary influence of stockowners on CG is 
exercised through the AGM. This influence has its legal basis in Articles 295–
319 of the Companies Act. Shareowners can exert their influence by voting in the 
meeting (Article 310); however, most individual stockowners feel it onerous to 
attend AGMs to cast their votes. Instead they delegate their vote to a proxy, 
usually a director or officer of the company, who is a member of the management 
group. This empowers management to take over the voting rights of a large 
portion of stockowners (Ohtsu and Imanari, 2002). In effect, this waters down the 
idea of CG by stockowners, the real owners of the company.  
  
In order to guide the affairs of the company, the stockowners elect a 
board of directors (torishimariyaku-kai), who on their behalf supervise the affairs 
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of the corporation to achieve its goals and protect stockowners' interests. Usually, 
this board elects a chairperson who is responsible for overseeing the entire 
business. The board also selects officers, who are responsible for specific aspects 
of the company's business. Yet, because of the prevailing system of proxy, 
management actually selects the directors. The chairman position is traditionally 
filled by a retired or former president. As Ohtsu and Imanari (2002) observe, 
virtually all board members are corporate officers appointed by the president or 
chairman. Board members usually carry out functional responsibilities like the 
general management of a division, department, or branch. Consequently, the 
board becomes a de facto executive body under the control of the president. The 
board members are called yakuin or officers, and they constitute the top 
management: president, vice president, senior managing directors (senmu 
torishimariyaku), and managing directors (jomu torishimariyaku). As a practical 
matter, managing directors are the real decision makers in Japanese firms. They 
often do not consider the interests of stockowners; they themselves may have 
little actual stock ownership. For this reason, the advocates of strong CG in Japan 
argue that the board of directors needs to be changed in accordance with the 
provisions of the Companies Act. In recent years, because of directives from the 
stock exchanges, public pressure, government guidance, and a new code of 
governance, some companies (Softbank, Orix, Snow Brand Milk Products, and 
Toyota Motor) have brought in directors who are not selected from internal 
management.   
 
Board of Auditors and Governance   
 
Most large Japanese companies have a board of statutory auditors (kansayaku), 
separate from the board of directors; these auditors are elected at the shareholders 
meeting (see Figure 1). As many companies belong to a formal keiretsu 
(affiliated company group) and other less formal groups, external directors and 
auditors are often from other companies in the same group. As a result, many 
external directors and corporate auditors are actually officers in related 
companies (Demise, 2006a).  The authority and responsibility of the auditors are 
determined by provisions in the Companies Act (Articles 381–384).  
 
The statutory auditor system existed even before World War II, but its 
authority, responsibility, and independence were transformed through a number 
of revisions in the Commercial Code in 1974, 1981, 1993, 2001, and 2003. 
Through the revision in 1993, large companies with a registered capital of ¥500 
million or more or a total liability of ¥20 billion or more were required to 
introduce a board of corporate auditors composed of at least three part-time 
members and at least one full-time member (Demise, 2006a; JASBA, 2007). 
While many of the corporate auditors are former employees of the companies, 
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currently it is required that at least half be outsiders. A member of the board of 
auditors cannot serve on the corporate board of directors at the same time.  
 
According to the Companies Act (Article 381), the responsibilities of the 
auditors are: (a) examining the execution of duties by directors, (b) preparing 
reports in response to the instructions of government ministries (the Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) in particular), (c) requesting reports on the business at any time 
from the directors, accounting advisors, managers, and other employees, (d) 
investigating the status of the operations and the financial status of the company, 
and (e) requesting reports on the business form of a subsidiary and investigating 
the status of its operations and financial status. Furthermore, in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 390, the auditor shall prepare audit reports, appoint and 
remove full-time company auditors, decide audit policy and methods to 
investigate the status of operations and the financial status of the company, and 
report on the status of the execution of their duties (Ministry of Justice (MOJ), 
2005).  
 
 
  
Figure 1. Companies with a Board of Corporate Auditors (Demise, 2006a). 
  
The duties of the auditors as stipulated in this law (Articles 382 and 405) 
are as follows: (a) reporting to the board of directors without delay on the 
misconduct of any director, or likelihood to engage in misconduct, in violation of 
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laws and regulations or articles of incorporation, (b) attending the board meetings 
and stating opinions, if necessary, (c) demanding that the directors call a board 
meeting, if necessary, and (c) investigating proposals, documents, and other items 
prescribed by the ordinances of the ministry, which the directors need to submit 
to stockowner meetings (MOJ, 2005).   
 
Consistent with the provisions of the above act, the Japan Audit and 
Supervisory Board Members Association (Nihon kansayaku kyokai/ JASBA) and 
the Japan Association of Corporate Directors (Nihon torishimari kyokai/ JACD) 
have developed rules that further clarify the rights, duties, and audit procedures 
of corporate auditors. JASBA upholds and articulates the provisions of the 
Companies Act. It regards the relationship between an audit board member and 
the company as an "entrustment" (inin), and consequently, the auditor owes a 
"duty of care" to the company. That legal duty includes checking the activities of 
directors through audits of financial reports as per the provisions in the 
Companies Act (JASBA, 2007). In so doing, they can create a structure to 
conduct audits, determine audit policy, prepare audit plans, examine audit 
methods and initiate actual processes, and write the audit report as well (JASBA, 
2007).   
 
The audit done by the statutory auditors is indeed a strong tool to check 
and ensure whether directors are observing the laws, regulations, and the 
company charter's provisions in managing the company. This is also called a 
compliance audit, but this does not include any appropriateness audit of the 
directors' decision-making and management activities. JASBA emphasizes that, 
since the Companies Act imposes a duty of care upon the directors, a business 
audit must include a check to determine whether there were any breaches of the 
duty of care, and therefore, should also examine a director's business judgments 
(JASBA, 2007). Although Japanese firms report quarterly, generally the audit of 
the financial statements (called a financial audit) is done annually before the 
AGM. The audit report usually includes the result of financial and business 
audits. Together with the notice of the AGM, it is sent to all stockowners two 
weeks prior to the meeting. In addition to financial statements, under the 
Financial Instrument and Exchange Law as well as the Companies Act, a 
company should also report its consolidated financial statements, which are also 
subject to audit by the statutory auditors (JASBA, 2007). The auditor's report 
must clearly certify that the financial statements show a "true and fair view" of 
the business's results and the financial conditions of the company.   
 
In order to carry out his assigned duties, an auditor has a number of legal 
powers, such as, (a) to ask any director to provide a report on the operation of the 
company, (b) to examine the operations and assets of the company at any time, 
(c) to ask for a report and examine the operation and assets of the company's 
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subsidiaries, and (d) to obtain the full financial information of all subsidiaries 
(JASBA, 2007). JASBA's provision requires an auditor to issue notice to a 
director if he is aware of the possibility of any significant damage occurring to 
the company due to his actions.   
 
With a view to preventing any illegal action by the directors, the audit 
board members are entitled to attend all board meetings and an individual auditor 
is entitled to express opinions to prevent any illegal or inappropriate decision by 
the board of directors. Moreover, he has the right to call a board of directors 
meeting and can even call a meeting on his own authority. He can also report his 
judgment on any point of a director's statement to explain any violation of the law 
and the company's charter to the shareholders meeting (JASBA, 2007).   
 
The Japan Association of Corporate Directors (JACD) was established in 
2001 and framed its Best Practice Code for the board of corporate auditors in 
2005, thereby authorizing them to exercise their best judgments, to oversee 
operations, to report on disclosure, accountability and transparency, to conduct 
audits, to nominate directors and suggest remuneration, to ensure compliance and 
prevent malpractice, and to take action to prevent takeover bids (JACD, 2005). 
This organisation aims to ensure sustained development of the Japanese economy 
through enhanced efficiency of management by establishing an effective CG 
system (JACD, 2005). In its mission statement, JASBA has assigned to its 
members an ambitious responsibility for strengthening corporate governance 
alongside corporate management and urges them to carry out duties in a 
principled and professional manner with accountability in all circumstances 
(JASBA, 2014).   
 
Board Committees and Governance   
 
The revised Commercial Code of 2003 required that companies introduce a board 
committee system (Figure 2). This matter is included now in Section 10, Articles 
400 to 409 in the Companies Act. In this system, a board committee is composed 
of the nominating committee, the compensation committee, and the audit 
committee (Article 404). These committees are composed of three or more 
members from among the directors by resolution of the board of directors. The 
majority of the members of these committees must come from outside the 
company (Article 400). Also, members of the audit committee cannot 
concurrently act as an executive officer, executive director, accounting adviser, or 
manager of an affiliated company or subsidiary firm. 
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Figure 2. Companies with the Board Committee System (Demise, 2006a, adapted). 
 
The authority of these committees is stipulated in Article 404 of the 
Companies Act. The nominating committee determines the contents of proposals 
concerning the election and dismissal of directors and accounting advisors (in 
companies with an Accounting Advisors system) for submission to the 
shareholders meeting. The audit committee examines the execution of duties by 
the executive officers, namely directors and accounting advisors, and determines 
the contents of proposals concerning elections, dismissals, and reelections of 
accounting auditors to the shareholders meeting. The compensation committee 
determines the remunerations of the executive officers.  
  
Major Japanese electronics companies such as Hitachi, Sony, and 
Toshiba have adopted this model because it mitigates problems associated with 
the separation of ownership and control. Through adopting this board committee 
system, as observed in Demise (2006a), Sony aimed to enhance its group CG by 
improving management transparency and boosting the role of the board as a 
monitoring body. Toshiba adopted this system to reinforce supervisory functions 
and management transparency and to improve operating flexibility. Hitachi, on 
the other hand, aimed at improving its decision-making speed, ensuring more 
transparent management practices and improving its global management. In 
companies with this board committee system, stockowners do not have the right 
to elect corporate auditors nor to nominate board members (Demise, 2006a).   
 
In addition to these, there are companies that have introduced ethics 
committees, which are usually chaired by external directors. As the number of 
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foreign investors has increased, there is a trend to include outside members in 
these ethics committees with responsibility for communication with foreign 
investors (Demise, 2006a).   
 
Institutional Investors and Governance   
 
In the Japanese corporate environment, institutional investors—mainly banks and 
other corporate investors—play a significant role in establishing CG. As Miwa 
(2006a) observes, institutional investors have become more involved in corporate 
governance by using stockowner proxy votes and promoting socially responsible 
investment (SRI), which means investing in companies that consider their 
corporate social responsibility (CSR).  Such investors consider not only the gains 
their investments return but also the full impact of the firm on society.   
 
Institutional investors have gained prominence in Japan since the start of 
the current century. There are certain historical reasons for this. Holding the stock 
of other companies is very common in Japan.  Banks and other large corporations 
hold the stock of related and unrelated companies. These companies are 
monitored by their investors in the context of mutual stock ownership within the 
cross-shareholding system.1 CSR gained importance in Japan after the Enron 
crisis in the US, and also since the 1990s when scandals related to illegal loss 
compensation by stockbrokers became public. The Japan Federation of Economic 
Organisations (Keidanren) developed a Charter of Good Corporate Behavior for 
its member companies. In the face of frequent scandals among its member 
companies, it revised the charter three times.  In May 2004 it incorporated social 
justice and environmental management as part of its model of ideal corporate 
behavior, with increasing stress on CSR (Miwa, 2006a). The Japan Association 
of Corporate Executives (Shacho Kaigi) issued a Corporate White Paper in 2003, 
spelling out the importance of CSR. This gained further impetus from a story in 
the Nihon Keizai Shimbun on 1000 major companies published on January 14, 
2004, which found nearly 45% of the companies had instituted CSR by 2003 
(Miwa, 2006a).   
 
Japanese institutional investors have a friendly attitude to CSR, in that 
they establish funds to promote investment in companies that consider their 
social responsibilities. The first such fund, the Eco Fund, was established in 
August 1999 by Nikko Asset Management.  Asahi Life Asset started selling its 
Asu no Hane in September 2000 and promoted several of its CSR aspects, 
namely consumer responsiveness, employment quality, and social contributions. 
By December 2003, 18 socially responsible investment funds were established by 
several different investment trusts (Miwa, 2006a). However, the financial 
performance of these funds has been mixed. Total fund value reached 200 billion 
yen in 1999, but plummeted to 60 billion yen in 2003. The number of these funds 
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increased to 2500 in September 2004 (Miwa, 2006a). Although the number of 
socially responsible investment funds increased in the first half of the 2000s, their 
attractiveness has greatly diminished recently.   
 
Socially responsible investment funds have the potential to play a very 
positive role in CG. Miwa (2006b) found that two prominent funds, the Pension 
Fund Association and the Pension Fund Association for Local Government 
Officials, have devised ways to exercise their voting rights in a positive way 
without any direct corporate influence. They are able to voice their opinions 
about CSR in all governance issues. There also exist institutions such as trust 
banks, life insurance companies, and investment advisory firms that invest the 
assets of employee pension funds. They are given the "necessary authority to 
carry out investment for customers concerned." Miwa (2006b) found that the 
pension fund sponsors propose guidelines on voting rights in "basic investment 
policies" and "management investment policies" to tackle social issues in a 
positive manner. Even here, the ultimate decision making authority on exercising 
shareholders' voting rights is left with the fiduciary institutions. These institutions 
need to report their business results, for which quantitative evaluation criteria are 
available. The investment advisor firms possess self-regulating rules for their 
investment business and ideally take a leading role in exercising shareholders' 
voting rights (Miwa, 2006b) to protect stockowners and advance socially 
responsible causes. Importantly, Japan's recently introduced Stewardship Code 
requires institutional investors to enhance medium- to long-term investment 
returns for their clients and beneficiaries by improving corporate value and 
promoting sustainable growth through constructive engagement. The code 
defines institutional investors as "asset managers" and "asset owners".  It requires 
the former to enhance the corporate value of companies through day-to-day 
constructive dialogue. Asset owners are requested to fully disclose their 
stewardship responsibility policies (Council of Experts Concerning the Japanese 
Version of the Stewardship Code, 2014).   
 
Stakeholder Governance  
  
CG in Japan is based on the understanding that a business corporation is 
accountable to multiple stakeholders including creditors, employees, business 
partners, and interested parties in society.  In addition to the regular stockowners, 
banks, buyers and suppliers, and other associates invest in the company's shares, 
but these investors are mostly interested in the long-term growth and prosperity 
of the firm rather than short-term profits (Ahmadjian, 2002). High dividends and 
stock prices are less attractive to them; rather they are more interested in seeing 
an increase in the market share of the company (Ohtsu & Imanari, 2002).   
One characteristic feature of Japanese business is the keiretsu (affiliated 
company group) system and business financing from a large bank, usually called 
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the "main bank". The main bank acts as the nucleus of the financing system, 
holds shares in the companies, provides bulk loans and extends working capital 
to companies in the group. Before and after investing in its stock and extending 
loans, the main bank thoroughly examines a firm's overall position, including its 
business strategy, technology, business links, and future plans. It is potentially a 
very powerful monitor of the activities of client firms from the perspective of 
other creditors and the remaining shareholders.   
 
The main bank provides insurance against financial distress and is a 
lender of last resort to the firm because other creditors will abandon the firm if it 
faces problems (Scher, 2002). As the governance and monitoring agent, it 
supplements the role of the other creditors and shareholders.  As a matter of fact, 
the main bank acts as a watchdog on its client firms by continuously monitoring 
their creditworthiness and financial viability. Since the keiretsu system prevails 
in the banking sector also, the main banker's related trust bank (shintaku ginko), 
insurance companies, and firms closely related to it may also invest in the firm. 
This cross-shareholding helps exercise governance for their mutual benefit. It is 
quite common that the main bank places one or two of its executives on a firm's 
board of directors. Although the main bank's role was seriously questioned during 
the collapse of the bubble economy (characterised as excessive speculation in 
land and the stock market) in the early 1990s and the period of severe crisis 
(mainly of non-performing loans) in the banking industry in the late 1990s, the 
system is still in good shape because small and medium-sized Japanese firms 
remain heavily dependent on bank financing.   
 
Another important part of CG in Japan is the employees in the company. 
Historically, under the prevalent managerial paternalism, the employing firm has 
an unwritten but binding obligation to provide continuous and stable 
employment. Under the lifetime, or permanent employment system large 
corporations must provide job security and career advancement opportunities to 
all full-time employees. The Japanese job market encourages vertical mobility 
within the firm and discourages horizontal movement between firms. As a result, 
the employing firm and its management possess a de facto obligation to sustain 
the growth of the firm to offer increasing opportunities for career growth to 
employees (Khondaker, 1997). As their career prospects are linked to the fate of 
the firm, employees continuously monitor the activities of management. 
Although Japanese employees are not represented on the board, their concern 
with management efficiency goes a long way to promoting better corporate 
governance.   
 
Under Japanese-style management and its supply-chain management, 
buyers and suppliers also constitute powerful stakeholders and exercise a strong 
role in consolidating governance. Large-scale final product manufacturers in the 
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automobile, electric, and machinery industries, which mostly operate just-in-time 
inventory systems, promote and manage strong tie-ups with parts-makers and 
ancillary suppliers called shitauke (subcontractors).  In order to reduce lead times 
for supply and delivery, such makers build factories in close proximity to their 
main buyers. Large manufacturers and even their keiretsu firms invest in the 
equity of shitauke, place their own representatives on the board to exercise 
oversight, provide them with technical support, and dispatch experts to support 
them. Buyers also train suppliers' engineers and core employees in their 
manufacturing systems. Some supplying firms depend exclusively on these large 
buyers and do not possess external markets. Thus, a mutual interdependence and 
unity of interests prevail among them. Ahmadjian (2002) observes that a firm's 
obligation to its buyers and suppliers and the ability to monitor one another 
depends mostly on a set of normative understandings concerning its obligations 
to its trading partners.   
 
The government and society also have a keen interest in the activities of 
firms and corporations in Japan. To give a few examples, the government urges 
corporate management to exercise fair and constructive practices and offer stable 
employment and income, urges corporate responsibility in national economic 
development, promotes employment for women, and encourages investment in 
rural districts. Bureaucrats influence management and CG through extralegal 
methods in the guise of amakudari.2 The consumers' association also keeps a 
vigilant eye on CG, especially in matters of safeguarding consumers' interests. 
 
   
ACCOUNTING, DISCLOSURE, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING IN 
JAPAN 
   
Accounting   
 
Articles 431–435 of the Companies Act include provisions regarding the use of 
accounting principles and the types of financial statements to be prepared by a 
public company. The accounting must be subject to business practices generally 
accepted as fair, appropriate, and pursuant to the applicable ordinance of the 
MOJ. And all accounts and important materials regarding business must be 
retained for ten years from the time of closing and preparation of the financial 
statements. Any shareholder holding three percent of the voting rights can request 
at any time to inspect those accounts.   
 
Financial statements in Japan include profit and loss statements, balance 
sheets, and most other commonly used statements (cash flow statements and 
consolidated financial statements) prescribed by any applicable ordinance of the 
ministry. A company is also required to prepare necessary business reports for 
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each year accompanied by the necessary supplementary statements. A number of 
ministries and departments, namely MOJ, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
Financial Services Agency (FSA / Kinyu-cho) under the Cabinet Office, exercise 
control of accounting practices. In order to develop corporate accounting 
standards, the FSA established a Financial Accounting Standard Foundation or 
FASF (Zaimu Kaikei Kijun Kiko) in July 2001, and the Business Accounting 
Standard Committee of Japan or ASBJ (Kigyo Kakei Kijun Iinkai) was set up 
within this agency.   
 
Three laws govern financial accounting practices and reporting in Japan. 
Of these, the Companies Act has replaced the provisions of the Commercial 
Code, and it applies to all public corporations.  It is primarily concerned with the 
protection of creditors and shareholders, and defines how assets, liabilities, 
revenues, expenses, and net income are to be calculated. It also provides 
guidelines for how financial statements are to be announced to the public and 
submitted to shareholders meetings, and how any temporary financial statements 
will be made. The Financial Instruments and Exchange Act governs the 
information disclosure obligations of all listed public companies and helps 
investors make their decisions.  The Corporate Income Tax Law governs some 
accounting measurement issues, such as income appropriation and tax 
deductions, that are not covered in other laws.   
 
The ASBJ has developed 26 Japanese corporate accounting standards.  It 
takes into account International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and other 
standards issued by leading national standard setters, especially the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board in the US These Japanese accounting standards 
have some elements that differ from international and US standards in the areas 
of directors' remuneration, audit fees, and business combinations, and are 
considered less meaningful by foreign investors (Nakoshi, 2006).   
 
Disclosure  
  
In accordance with the disclosure concept of accounting, the corporation must 
transmit all material financial data either in the body of its financial statements or 
in the attached explanatory notes. Especially, full disclosure is needed with 
respect to the method of charging depreciation, valuation of inventory and assets, 
declaration of dividends, directors' remuneration, audit fees, business 
combinations, bad and doubtful debts, contingent liabilities, acquisitions, and 
changes in accounting methods.  The company must give full disclosure of all 
material facts necessary for a complete understanding by third parties or that are 
relevant to decision-making that might be based on the financial statements.  The 
Japanese Companies Act and generally agreed accounting principles (GAAP) 
uphold the spirit of accounting disclosure.   
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After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US, the announcements of 
earnings in financial statements and securities reporting in Japan have 
conspicuously increased. The contents of such disclosure documents are very 
similar to those in Europe and the US, and consequently disclosures concerning 
governance have widened (Nakoshi, 2006). Furthermore, the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange announced a set of "Basic ideas concerning corporate governance and 
execution conditions", which reflected the suggestions submitted to it by many 
listed companies concerning decision-making, execution mechanisms, election of 
external directors, external auditors, human relations, capital relations, self-
dealing relations, and other interests (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2013). The 
mechanisms of operating audit, accounting audit, and internal audit were set out 
in detail. Disclosure on remuneration was divided into two parts, one for directors 
and the other for auditors. They must report their numbers and the amount of 
each director's remuneration; and no distinction was made between internal and 
external directors (Nakoshi, 2006). This practice is now followed by many 
Japanese companies.   
 
Another important milestone concerning disclosure in Japan and yet 
another great influence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that all listed companies 
are required to include in their prospectus and securities report an item on the 
"Situation of the corporate governance". Two additional items, "Risk of business" 
and "Analysis of the financial position and the management result," are also now 
required. This has created new obligations for management regarding the 
disclosure of material facts and significantly raised the quality of Japan's 
financial reporting (Nakoshi, 2006).   
 
Financial Reporting 
 
The situation of financial reporting in Japan is outlined here along the lines 
described by Singleton and Okazaki (2002). Both the Companies Act and the 
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act require companies to submit a business 
report for every accounting year together with a balance sheet, income statement, 
statement of appropriations of retained earnings, and supplementary statements to 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Securities Exchange Commission.  The 
format, classification, extent of disclosure, and the type of supplementary 
information differ as required by these two agencies. The Companies Act requires 
the following supplementary information: (a) changes in capital stock and 
reserves, (b) changes in bonds payable and other debt instruments, (c) changes in 
fixed assets and accumulated depreciation, (d) the amount of debt guarantees and 
collateral assets, (e) related party transactions, such as with subsidiaries, 
directors, and controlling shareholders, and (f) ownership of subsidiaries. 
Although the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act requires similar 
information to be submitted to the MOF, this ministry requires additional 
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information: details on pension obligations, marketable securities, and intangible 
assets. It also requires additional forecasts of capital expenditures, debt 
requirements, a cash flow statement, and a six-month cash flow forecast. 
However, these are not required to be audited (Singleton & Okazaki, 2002).   
 
Companies that are listed on the stock markets are subject to the 
Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. They are required to submit 
consolidated financial statements including a balance sheet, income statement, 
and cash flow statement.  The financial statement of a subsidiary company must 
be consolidated with those of the parent company when the latter holds more than 
50 percent of the stock in the subsidiary. The law precludes some categories of 
subsidiary from inclusion in the consolidated statement.  But the requirement of 
consolidated financial statements increases the transparency of the corporation, 
and especially of the operation of unprofitable subsidiaries (Singleton & Okazaki, 
2002). Depending on the submission requirements of the specific agency, 
financial statement formats differ. For the balance sheet, assets, liabilities, and 
equity must be classified separately. Current assets and current liabilities are 
distinguished from long-term items. The income statement is required to have an 
additional section for special gains and losses, which also include prior period 
adjustments (Singleton & Okazaki, 2002).   
 
The MOF holds the upper hand on all matters in connection with 
financial reporting by companies in Japan. The MOF requires disclosure of the 
major segments of a firm's operations, classified into lines of business and 
geographical sectors in footnotes, and with particular disclosure on each 
segment's turnover, assets, and operating income. According to Article 496 of the 
Companies Act, the financial statements, business reports, and supplementary 
schedules must be audited. The auditor's duty is to attest to the authenticity of the 
financial statements. Companies listed on the stock market and unlisted 
companies that have share capital exceeding ¥500 million and liabilities of ¥20 
billion, are required to have their accounts and financial statements audited by a 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA). This accountant must certify that financial 
statements show a true and fair view of the business's performance and the 
financial position of the company.   
 
The Status of International Financial Reporting Standards in Japan   
 
Although the Japanese accounting principles are similar to those in other 
industrialised countries, especially the US, in fact, many differences remain. 
Japan has not yet adopted international reporting standards; rather, it has 
developed its own standards that are broadly in line with those of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The standard setting process 
is complicated and slow. The Business Accounting Council or BAC (Kigyo 
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Kaikei Shingikai) of the FSA suggests that it is appropriate for the ASBJ, which 
is capable of developing accounting standards and authorised to do so, to first 
examine the contents of the IFRS, so that it can design standards consistent with 
those used by Japanese GAAP (ASBJ, 2013). Consequently, the ASBJ is trying 
to harmonise its accounting rules and reporting standards with the global norms. 
In August 2007 the ASBJ and the International Accounting Standard Board 
(IASB) signed an agreement intended to accelerate the convergence between 
Japanese GAAP and IFRS. In accordance with this agreement, some major 
differences between Japanese GAAP and IFRS were eliminated in the first phase 
by 2008 and the remaining differences were removed by June 2011. The 
European Commission (EC) concluded in December 2008 that Japanese GAAP 
were equivalent to the IFRS adopted by the European Union (JICPA, 2015). 
According to a report in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun dated 4 March 2015, by the 
end of 2013, 25 large companies had introduced IFRS.  This increased to more 
than 100 companies by 2014. The list includes Hitachi Seisakujo, Toshiba, 
Honda, Nidec, JX Holdings, Iida Group Holdings, and many other prominent 
companies. It is likely that many other Japanese companies will soon switch to 
IFRS. One major motivation of the shift to IFRS is that it will facilitate foreign 
acquisitions in Europe, North America, and other developed countries (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 2015).   
 
Window Dressing in Financial Statements   
 
Fraudulent financial reporting is easy to define. It is simply reporting inaccurate 
values for assets, liabilities, and cash flows. It includes practices such as 
reporting sales and expenses in periods when the sales or expenses are not 
actually incurred. Such activities are a clear violation of accounting principles. As 
mentioned above, according to the prevailing laws and customs in Japan, 
financial statements must show a true and fair view of performance and the state 
of affairs of the company in the most accurate form and understandable way.  In 
contrast to fraudulent financial reporting, window dressing is the process of 
manipulation of financial information; it intends to give users a more favorable 
impression of the performance and the position of the company (Khan, 2000). 
The practice is not necessarily fraudulent, but it is a willful maneuver to show a 
better performance and state of affairs. In reality, the state of affairs shown is not 
typical of what prevailed throughout the year. Companies resort to it to show a 
stronger business position than competitors, influence prices in the stock market, 
sell a new stock or bond issue, deceive the tax authority, conceal a liquidity 
crisis, defend against hostile takeovers, hide managerial inefficiency, pay or 
receive shoddy bonuses, and deceive unsophisticated investors. Griffiths (1986) 
humorously calls window dressing creative accounting whereby, "every 
company in the country is fiddling its profits. Every set of published accounts is 
based on books which have been gently cooked or completely roasted. The 
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figures which are fed twice a year to the investing public have been changed to 
protect the guilty. It is the biggest con trick since the Trojan Horse." He further 
argues that although the accounting standard regimes have undergone drastic 
changes in the 1990s, there still exist a plethora of devices that a company can 
adopt to show its performance and position in a better light.   
 
Many of the accounting scandals that occurred in Japan in recent years 
involved the nation's top companies and auditing firms. This, despite the fact that 
Japan possesses very fine accounting regimes, accounting and auditing standards, 
and many surveillance authorities. Window dressing went unnoticed and 
undetected because regulatory regimes and protections are, in practice, lax. The 
accounting and auditing professions are largely controlled by powerful business 
elites. The latest scandals include major companies like Kanebo, Livedoor, Daio 
Seishi, Toshiba, and Akebono Brake. These scandals, especially Olympus's 
decades-long accounting deceit and Toshiba's enormous markdown, shocked the 
nation and the business community (Olympus Corporation, Third Party 
Committee, 2011 and Mochizuki, 2015). Teikoku Data Bank (various years) 
reported that there were 10 window-dressing cases in 2005, 17 in 2006, 35 in 
2007, 44 in 2008, 25 in 2009, 40 in 2010, 59 in 2011, 57 in 2012, 52 in 2013, and 
88 in 2014.  These show the enormity of the problem in Japan.  Most of these 
scandals were made possible, or were permitted to endure, because of accounting 
fraud, flexible financial reporting, excessive window dressing, and violations of 
compliance requirements.   
 
Auditor's Liability 
 
Audit Board Member (Kansayaku)   
 
Under Articles 429 and 430 of the Companies Act, an audit board member is 
liable to the company if there is any breach of "duty of care" owed to it. 
Moreover, if there is any bad faith or gross negligence in performing audit 
activities, or if the audit report contains any false statement, the concerned 
member will be directly liable to the third party (MOJ, 2005).   
 
Accounting Auditors (Kansahojin)   
 
Theoretically, auditors' offenses in connection with creative accounting practices 
to window-dress financial statements can be labeled professional negligence, 
misfeasance (breach of trust or duty imposed by law), and professional 
misconduct—for which they can be prosecuted under the civil and criminal laws 
of the country. Most of these offences happen due to non-compliance with 
professional codes of conduct and ethics, failure to follow accounting and 
auditing standards, and malicious collusion with clients.   
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The auditors' responsibility is one of the most debated and controversial 
topics among auditors, academics, media, regulating authorities, and the public 
(Gay, Schelluch, & Reid, 1997). The debate has become exacerbated by the 
collapse of big corporations such as Enron and WorldCom. The debacles of 
Enron, AIG, WorldCom, and Sunbeam in the US, Parmalat in Italy, Satyam 
Computer in India, One.Tel in Australia, and several other big frauds in Germany 
and South Korea prove that accounting scandals are blind to geography 
(Financial Week, 2009), and the national status of companies and audit firms. 
Financial report users perceive auditors' duties to be detecting and reporting 
frauds more than looking into compliance with statutes and audit standards (Lee, 
Md. Ali, & Gloeck, 2008). Auditors must assume both professional and legal 
duties while examining their clients' financial statements (Ang & Lim, 2008).   
 
In the aftermath of scandals at some prominent companies, including 
Kanebo and Livedoor, the FSA developed internal control regulations in 2007. In 
2006 it took 163 administrative disciplinary actions against financial institutions, 
which was an increase by 50% over the previous year. The FSA instituted those 
legal measures to enhance internal controls in the listed companies.  These 
measures are nicknamed J-SOX by the Japanese media (Carozza, 2007) after the 
nickname for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
 
Theoretically, complaints and litigations by any party may give rise to 
liabilities, which can be categorised as liabilities to clients and liabilities to third 
parties. The first category arises due to professional negligence in carrying out 
assigned responsibilities and for committing misfeasance.  When sued, the court 
investigates under Civil law or Criminal law depending on the nature of the 
alleged offense. The court may refer to all the principles and rules that regulate 
the affairs of the accounting and auditing profession in the country. The final 
verdict of the court, whether it is a financial penalty or a professional penalty, is 
given with due reference to the precedents and verdicts set in earlier cases.   
 
However, in Japan the penalties for accounting misstatements are less 
severe than those in the US In accordance with Article 197(2) of the Financial 
Instruments and Exchange Law, the court can imprison an auditor for up to ten 
years and/or can impose a fine of up to 10 million yen. For any misstatement in 
the internal control report, the penalty is imprisonment for up to five years and/or 
a fine of up to 5 million yen (Carozza, 2007). Table 1 shows a summary of the 
various offenses and liabilities under the jurisdiction of these different laws.   
 
An aggrieved party can also lodge complaints against an auditor, or his 
affiliated audit firm. It is mandatory on the part of professional auditors in Japan 
to strictly follow the guidelines of the CPA Law. If they fail to follow any of the 
rules, charges for professional misconduct can be filed against them. In such 
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cases, with due investigation into the content of the complaint, the Prime 
Minister’s office may either issue a tough reprimand, or may cancel membership, 
or may withhold membership for a period of up to two years, which precludes the 
auditor from undertaking any professional activity. The office may even ask for 
the dissolution of the audit firm (Yamaura, 2012). 
 
Table 1 
Liabilities for auditors for window dressing of financial statements 
 
Type of Offense Related Law Liability 
Criminal offense Financial Instrument and 
Exchange Law 
Maximum of 10 years in prison or fines of 10 
million yen (¥) (personal abatement or joint 
offense) 
Administrative 
punishment 
Companies Law Fine of up to ¥ 1 million 
Financial Instrument 
 and Exchange Law 
Accepted disposal 
CPA Law Individual auditor: Reprimand, withhold from 
practice for two years, cancellation of 
membership, surcharge payment 
Auditing firm: Reprimand, order to improve 
business management, withhold from practice 
for two years, dissolution, surcharge payment 
Civil offense  Companies Act  Liability for damage (audited company, third 
party) 
Financial Instrument and 
Exchange Law 
Liability for damages (investor) 
 
 
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CG AND REPORTING IN JAPAN   
 
The CG debate in Japan is relatively newer than that in the US and Europe (Aoi, 
1997). In part, this is because CG faces somewhat different challenges in Japan's 
unique business environment. As described above and further explained below, 
cross-shareholding, the main bank system and stakeholder governance mean that 
the traditional preeminent focus on shareholder rights and value is diminished in 
Japan. Nevertheless, CG in Japan is broadly similar to corporate governance in 
other developed countries; its primary focuses are on the rights and treatment of 
stockowners, responsibilities of the board, and accurate financial reporting.3 It 
was only in the 1990s that the debate got some momentum when corporate 
earnings, investment, and stock prices declined tremendously. The actual 
governance at that time was rather lax. The practice of cross-shareholding among 
companies has prevented shareholders from exerting sufficient influence on 
management. Corporations can deny shareholders any means of effective 
oversight of investment policies and retain excess capital instead of returning it to 
shareholders, which leads to inefficiency (Aoi, 1997) and conflict among 
stakeholders (Kester, 1997). Due to their close relationship with banks, 
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management did not feel the presence of capital constraints even during the 
period of high growth in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. This allowed firms to 
make long-term investments in facilities and expansive R&D expenditures for 
product and process development.  The negative impact of this was that many 
Japanese companies embarked on unrelated diversification and expansion. On the 
whole, these investments were not viable—indeed, these ill-advised investments 
are one of the reasons that Japan has experienced low economic growth over the 
last 25 years. It is a painful reminder that poor CG has a broader impact than 
simply damaging the interests of stockowners.   
 
Since the inclusion of the provisions regarding corporate accounting and 
auditing into the Companies Act from the Commercial Code around 2005 or so, 
some hundreds of companies have adopted the board committee system. Toyota, 
Matsushita, Sony, and Canon have adopted this system, reduced the size of their 
boards, and introduced corporate auditors from outside. Many companies have 
adopted an executive officer system (shikko yakuin) to introduce the small board 
system and to separate execution from decision-making (Ahmadjian 2002; 
Demise, 2006a).   
 
According to Sherman (1997), main bank and cross-shareholding of 
stock result in a situation where the inside shareholders hold effective power and 
the outside shareholders do not. Similarly, inside directors have power, but 
outside directors do not.  This situation has seriously reduced the effectiveness of 
CG in Japan. Especially in the 1990s, when the bubble economy burst and 
corporate scandals erupted, there was a collapse of corporate growth and business 
confidence. To a degree, these were all attributable to lax CG. The stakeholder 
system was blamed for fostering insular thinking and a lack of accountability 
(Ahmadjian, 2002). The lifetime and seniority employment system was blamed 
for breeding deadwood inside firms, which obstructed merit-based reward 
systems.  The long-term buyer-supplier relationship is also blamed because large, 
powerful corporations precluded firm-specific specialisation by small and 
medium-sized enterprises. This was done through the large firms placing their 
own employees on the boards of the small firms. In this way, their boards do not 
allow them to exercise their own decision-making and management authority in 
view of their specific circumstances (Chernenko, Foley, & Greenwood, 2012).   
 
From the 1990s onward, foreign investment in the Japanese stock market 
has increased.  Although companies are increasingly interested in incorporating 
external directors on their boards, both individual and institutional foreign 
investors are reluctant to take part in high-level management activities. Yet they 
are pressuring firms to pay more attention to shareholder governance. The recent 
example of activist foreign investor Daniel Loeb's efforts to encourage Fanuc to 
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increase its dividend payout shows that Japanese firms can respond positively 
(McCombs & Clenfield, 2015).  
  
Some other changes have also taken place since the 1990s. After the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002 in the US, the basic concept of 
corporate governance and execution was refined and widened in Japan.  
Prospectuses and securities reports were required to include items on the situation 
of CG, business risk, financial position, and management result. This has created 
consciousness both inside and outside the companies. The Financial Instruments 
and Exchange Act, 2006 included new punitive measures to prevent fraudulent 
reporting in listed companies. The FSA, known as the Japanese version of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission, has also reinvigorated its surveillance 
activities. The government has reduced the fee for filing a lawsuit against 
executives for derivative losses and other premeditated malpractice. This has 
increased the number of cases against companies for actual and attempted 
misbehavior in compliance, reporting, and governance. Some companies also 
have reduced the size of their boards to reduce unscrupulous practices. The 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners has launched a Japan branch and 
started certification of fraud detectors since 2004. Consequently the number of 
trained and experienced fraud examiners has increased.   
 
 
JAPAN'S NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE   
 
In June of 2015, Japan adopted a new corporate governance code. The goal of 
this code is to raise corporate value over the medium and long-term. The code is 
the work of a council of experts, notably Professor Kunio Ito of Hitotsubashi 
University, Japan's Financial Services Agency, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
The code is consistent with the OECD's governance principles. The code is not 
legally binding; rather, its principles request that all corporations comply, or 
explain why they do not comply. Much of the code is conventional. It seeks to 
promote the rights and equal treatment of stockowners. Accurate financial 
information must be disclosed and decisions should be transparent. Cooperation 
with all stakeholders in the firm is encouraged.   
 
The new governance code's primary impact will come from three 
innovations. It calls for all corporations to have at least two outside board 
directors. These new external directors should be appointed by March 2016. This 
will be a challenge because most large Japanese firms have only one external 
director and some have no external directors at all. Although less than the 
majority of external directors required in some countries, this requirement could 
reduce the entrenchment of current corporate managements. The code also calls 
for an explanation for cross-shareholding, with the implicit suggestion that cross-
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ownership of shares damages value, hides poor performance, and entrenches 
management. Further, the code requires that this explanation be meaningful. 
Cliché, boilerplate explanations such as "… cross-shareholdings are considered 
investments aimed to strengthen competitiveness among suppliers and partners" 
will not be acceptable under the new code.4 This change could have a huge 
consequence if stable shareholders are replaced by owners who aggressively seek 
increased corporate value. Finally, the new code calls for companies to welcome 
greater participation by women in management and the establishment of 
independent whistleblowing systems. These changes offer perhaps the most 
significant long-term improvement in governance and performance, as they will 
reduce the ingrown mentality that dominates many companies.   
 
The arrival of the new governance code has coincided with an increased 
emphasis on improving profitability.  Professor Ito and other governance experts 
have called on all public firms to achieve a return on equity of at least eight 
percent. Further, a new stock index has been created that focuses on Japanese 
firms that meet global investment standards. This JPX-Nikkei Index 400 is 
composed of Japanese firms with good governance and good performance (Japan 
Exchange Group, 2015). Performance includes measurement with return on 
equity and governance specifically requires at least two outside directors and the 
adoption of (or commitment to adopt) International Financial Reporting 
Standards.   
 
The new code and other changes may indeed lead to significant 
improvements in Japanese corporate governance. This certainly would be a very 
good thing, both for companies themselves and the broader Japanese economy. 
Yet, a certain amount of skepticism is justified. The new code does not have the 
force of law; it does not specify punishments or sanctions. Corporate leaders may 
appoint outside directors who are not qualified to evaluate financial accounts. For 
example, a major computer maker has recently appointed a former astronaut to its 
board. The astronaut is undoubtedly intelligent and brave, but has no experience 
with finance. Similarly, the practice of cross-shareholding could be transformed 
into another kind of stable, passive ownership by introducing new classes of 
stock with limited selling rights and different payout claims. A major automaker 
has created just such a class of stock.  
 
 
HOW TO REDUCE FRAUDULENT REPORTING AND REFORM CG   
 
In order to enhance the effectiveness of governance, reducing fraudulent 
reporting is an essential precondition. In practice much fraudulent reporting arises 
from the discretion that managers have with respect to reporting revenues and 
costs. Traditional accounting gives managers a choice in that they can decide 
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whether to report revenues in the current period or later periods. This choice is 
based on accounting principles that in theory are clear but in fact can be 
interpreted in ways that managers find convenient. Internal accountants and 
independent auditors can limit this discretion in theory, but in practice auditors 
are often unwilling or unable to challenge managers. A similar situation applies 
to costs. Managers have an effective choice of whether to recognise expenses in 
the current period, or to capitalise these costs over later or longer periods.  The 
amortisation of goodwill is an item especially likely to be manipulated.   
 
The motivations of managers differ in the way they use their accounting 
discretion when they deal with tax collecting agencies, minority firm owners, 
creditors, and governance issues. Managers use their discretion to minimise 
reported profits when dealing with tax agencies. Managers usually elect to report 
better results when dealing with governance-focused groups and creditors (in the 
hope of qualifying for additional credit). Managers also have mixed fraudulent 
incentives when dealing with minority owners. In some related party transactions, 
they deceitfully report lower asset values (for example, when a manager-related 
party buys the asset from the company). In other cases, they report higher asset 
values (for cases when the company buys an asset from a party related to the 
management).   
 
In almost all cases, the problem is related to reporting assets, liabilities, 
and cash flows at wrong, or non-market, values. The inability of auditors to 
recognise (or reject) these wrong values makes the fraud successful. Therefore, 
any change that makes the transactions more likely to be reported at real market 
values, or minimises the discretion of managers to decide how to report revenues 
and costs reduces misleading reporting and improves governance. Anything that 
reduces related party transactions (and parallel transactions) will lead to 
improvements in both reporting and governance. Cash-flow accounting, if fully 
implemented, might improve financial reporting and governance. In terms of tax 
collection, anything that forces firms to report transactions at arm's length values 
will help improve reporting.   
 
Anything that improves the independence of auditors is good for clean 
financial reporting. Lack of genuine independence is especially detrimental to 
good CG. High-quality laws, codes, and guidelines will not produce good CG 
unless internal and external auditors have the genuine power to stand up to 
management to produce financial reports that accurately describe the assets, 
liabilities, and cash flows of firms.  So, borrowing words from the old Jim Croce 
song, auditors should be "meaner than a junkyard dog," and not the passive 
lapdogs they are today. Furthermore, there is a need to adopt the mentality that 
managers and workers are genuinely responsible for the care of the firm’s assets 
for the real owners of these assets: stockowners. 
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  As described above, failures of corporate governance are almost always 
linked to fraudulent or inaccurate financial reporting. High-quality laws and 
regulations that conform to best-practice, international standards will not 
contribute to good governance when managers are able to report inaccurate 
financial statements. This problem is vividly demonstrated by the recent case of 
Toshiba. Toshiba follows international financial accounting standards and has 
won numerous awards for social responsibility. Toshiba was in the JPX-Nikkei 
400 index of good Japanese firms and, Toshiba had four external directors on its 
board. Yet, Toshiba has experienced a fraudulent financial reporting scandal 
involving more than one billion dollars that has persisted for years under several 
management teams. Once the scandal became public knowledge, Toshiba was 
forced to reorganise its businesses.  Chronic underperforming business lines are 
being sold, closed, or repaired.   
 
Japan's new governance code is a joint product of academics, corporate 
managers, and financial market administrators. Of necessity it is a compromise. 
Because the code's adoption by companies is voluntary, the code cannot be 
excessively radical. Yet, the code could be better. So, in the context of recent 
scandals, poor corporate performance and with a view to enhancing the new 
corporate governance code, we suggest the following:   
 
1. Boards   
a) Boards and managers must pay more attention to shareholders' 
interests in the company. This includes making a dated commitment 
to earning a minimum return on equity and creating middle- and 
long-term value in a concrete way.   
b) Companies should make a dated commitment to achieve a certain 
proportion of their senior management and board being women. This 
will improve corporate governance and performance by diluting the 
ingrown mentality that has become common in many companies.   
c) Boards should introduce systems to communicate with the 
institutional shareholders and encourage them to increase investment 
in socially responsible projects/companies.  Boards should create a 
new committee alongside the existing committees to address outside 
shareholder queries, concerns, and suggestions. In this area, 
institutional investors should commit to follow Japan's Stewardship 
Code.   
d) The size of the boards is still impractical in many companies; it 
should be reduced. Boards should have at least two outside members. 
Ideally, a majority of board members should be external.   
e) Companies should make greater use of external board members in 
the audit committee.   
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2. Shareholder Meetings   
a) Companies should initiate a disclosure system for the nominees to 
board membership and seek the opinions of proxy voters beforehand 
while casting their proxy votes for any such nominee.   
b) Companies should simplify their registration and voting process and 
encourage shareholders to participate in the annual general meeting 
of shareholders.   
c) Companies should refrain from holding their annual shareholder 
meetings on the same last few days of June.   
d) For foreign shareholders, the board meeting's timing, proxy issues, 
and linguistic matters should be handled without any cultural bias.  
Companies should develop adequate and effective communication 
measures for non-Japanese.  
3. Financial Reporting   
a) Companies should change their certified public accountants every 
three years. A material restatement of financial results should trigger 
an automatic change in the firm's certified public accountant with the 
new accountant selected by Japan's Financial Services Agency.   
b) All reporting and CG measures should focus on prevention of 
malpractice rather than simple compliance with regulations.   
c) Companies should fully disclose all related-party transactions with 
directors and major shareholders.   
d) All Japanese public firms should adopt International Financial 
Reporting Standards.  
4. Stock Ownership   
a) Current interlocking parent-subsidiary relationships create onerous 
pressure, especially on the subsidiary companies. This should be 
mitigated to promote flexibility of management and better 
governance and allow genuine value-creation by subsidiaries.  
b) Companies should not create classes of stock with different voting 
rights, different payout rights, and limited selling rights. Preferred 
stock and debt securities should not have voting rights equivalent to 
common stock voting rights. In principle, all equity holders should 
receive equal treatment.   
c) Companies should eliminate cross-shareholding that does not have an 
economic rationale. 
5. Corporate Responsibility to Society   
a) Companies should make a dated commitment to establish an 
independent system for whistleblowing.   
b) Like most developed nations, Japan should encourage the 
development of independent shareholder research and proxy voting 
organisations.   
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c) The new Japanese Corporate Governance Code is an excellent start. 
However, the code's ultimate effect on governance will depend on 
how strongly boards are motivated to implement the code. Firms that 
fail to comply with the code should be removed from stock indices.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has described the current state of corporate governance and financial 
reporting in Japan. It has outlined the legal basis of how firms should be 
managed, and in whose interests firms should be run. Although the legal basis is 
good in the sense that it conforms to international standards, as a practical matter, 
the resulting governance is not what it should be. Both in terms of return on 
investment and in protecting the interests of shareholders, corporate governance 
in Japan leaves much to be desired. The paper argues that a key to good 
governance is accurate financial reporting. Fraudulent reporting has played a 
significant role in many recent examples of governance failure. The paper offers 
suggestions to enhance governance and improve financial reporting. However, 
the authors believe that most of the current problems and weaknesses in corporate 
governance in Japan can be mitigated if the company's annual general meeting 
functions effectively and auditors produce accurate financial reports. In view of 
the apparent effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, making the chief 
executive directly responsible for all financial reports might reduce fraudulent 
reporting and improve governance. Finally, the authors believe that these 
suggestions are relevant to corporate governance in other countries.   
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NOTES 
 
1. Mutual cross-shareholding is very common in Japan. For example, Company A 
will own some of the stock of Company B and Company B will own some of the 
stock of Company A. Cross-shareholding peaked in 1988 at 51% of shares based 
on market values. It is still high, at more than 10% on average.   
2. Amakudari is the practice of retired government bureaucrats being employed in 
the firms and organisations they formerly supervised.  The literal meaning of the 
term is "descent from heaven." 
Khondaker Mizanur Rahman and Marc Bremer  
120 
3. The OECD principles of corporate governance (2004) use the terms "disclosure" 
and "transparency" to refer to accurate financial reporting. Although much of 
Japan's corporate governance development is a result of domestic processes, 
concepts of corporate governance from other developed countries played 
important roles. In particular the "comply or explain" idea from the London 
Stock Exchange's principles and some concepts in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation from the US contributed to Japan's corporate governance. For more 
on this please see Demise (2006b). 
4. And in a similar way concerning external directors, boilerplate that explains the 
lack of these directors as due to "… the inability of outsiders to understand the 
business" will not be acceptable. 
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